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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a rural property line dispute. It was commenced by the Plaintiffs'
Complaint filed on March 11, 2010, in District Court.

The primary purpose of the initial

complaint was to obtain the legal description of a long-time existing fence. Mr. and Mrs. Sims
own the real property easterly of the fence line and Mr. and Mrs. Daker owned the real property
adjacent thereto and westerly of the fence line. The complaint was filed followed by a Motion
for Survey to determine the legal description of the long-existing fence. When the survey was
completed and the legal description of the fence ascertained, Mr. and Mrs. Sims filed an
Amended Complaint on November 2, 2010.

In the amended complaint Mr. and Mrs. Sims

claimed title to the real property described therein which is located easterly of the fence and
identified the Dakers as the owners and Randy Hollibaugh as a lessee of the real property
immediately westerly of their own real property. The entire purpose of this suit was to quiet title
to the real property lying easterly of the long-existing fence in Mr. and Mrs. Sims.
This case was tried in District Court without the intervention of a jury on January 17,
2012. The District Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
Quieting Title in Mr. and Mrs. Sims westerly to the existing fence.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Sims testified at the trial. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Daker was present at
the trial. They did not testify by deposition, telephone, or Skype.
Mr. and Mrs. Daker filed their Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2012.
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II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the commencement of this case the Dakers and Simses were neighbors: Dakers to the
west and Simses to the east. The Daker land was owned by Jim D. White prior to 1975 when he
entered into an escrow contract to sell it to Tannahills.

Following a mesne of transactions.

Dakers obtained title from Craftwall in 1983. "Pl. Ex. 8."
Alvin Smolinski. who owned a substantial amount of land on Greer Grade where the land
in question is, leased the Daker land when it was owned by White, by the intervening owners,
and by the Dakers. He rented from White for a few years "Tr. p.27. L. 1." After leasing it from
White, he leased it from Tannahill, then Craftwall, and ultimately the Dakers until at least 2004
"Tr. p.27, L. 20 to p.21, L. 6." Mr. Smolinski leased the Daker land for cattle. He took it upon
himself to maintain the fence in question "Tr. p.30, L. 2."
Mr. Smolinski considered the fence the boundary line between the Sims and Daker
properties "Tr. p.30, L. 14, and p.35, L. 8 to 18," and testified that that was the custom in the
area for fences ever since he could remember, probably 1967 "Tr. p.30, L. 20, to p.31, L. 7."
Mr. Smolinski testified that he first started pasturing livestock on the property in the mid70's "Tr. p.36, L. 7," and that it appeared that it was an old fence at that time "Tr. p.36, L. 18."
Therefore, the fence was in existence for over forty years. It never changed location. There was
no evidence of a gate in it.
Michael Kinzer who lives immediately above the Simses on Greer Grade testified that he
purchased his property in 1975, that the fence was not new then but in good shape and well built
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"Tr. p.SS, L. 7," and that critters and cattle were kept on both sides of the fence. There were two
different logging operations on the Daker side to his knowledge and they did not cross the fence
"Tr. p.SS, L. 21."
Linda Beard whose parents sold the Sims land to them and now lives on Greer Grade
testified that she was familiar with the Sims land and lived on it for about five and one-half years
"Tr. p.8S, L. 11 to 21," and that her understanding was the boundary lines were the fence lines
"Tr. p.8S, L. 22." The whole circumference of the property was fenced ·'Tr. p.86. L. 4:' They
had animals and cut firewood.
Mrs. Susan Sims testified that they moved into the residence on December 6, 1998. They
purchased it from Mrs. Beard's parents, Elgin and Claudia Larson. When they looked at the
property, Jimmy Sims walked the fence lines with Elgin while Claudia and Mrs. Sims talked on
the deck. Claudia told Susan that the fence lines were the boundary lines "Tr. p.92, L. 23 to
p.93, L. 14." She also testified that the parcel in dispute was essential to their privacy "Tr. p.97,
L. 20," and they had trees that they were nurturing "Tr. p.98, L. 18." They would not have
bought the property if the parcel in dispute was not included, "Tr. p.99, L. 13 to 19."
Both Mr. and Mrs. Sims talked to Mrs. Daker by phone in December, 2009, and January,
2010. Mrs. Sims talked; Mr. Sims listened on a second line. Mrs. Daker told them she and her
husband bought the entire Daker place by fence line "Tr. p.73, L. 10 to 13, p.74, L.19, p.9S, L.
13 to 19."
There was no evidence of anyone, other than possibly the surveyor, relying on the legal
descriptions in the deeds rather than the fence as the property boundary line.
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Hollibaugh, the Daker lessee, who hired the first survey, did not know the boundary line "Tr.
p.49, L. 18, p.50, L. 19."
During the pendency of this action in District Court, Mr. and Mrs. Daker sold all of their
land except the parcel in question to Randy and Lauri Hollibaugh. The parcel in question was
specifically excepted from that deed "Pl. Ex. 8."
III.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

l.

Are the District Court's findings of fact supported by substantial and competent.

although conflicting evidence?
2.

Mr. and Mrs. Sims claim attorneys fees on appeal based upon Section 12-121,

Idaho Code in conjunction with Rule 54( e)(1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho
Appellate Rule 41.
IV.
ARGUMENTS

The standard of review of an appeal from District Court is well established in Idaho and
set forth in Lettunich v. Lettunich, III P.3d 110. 141 Idaho 425, (Idaho, 2005). There our
Supreme Court stated:
When we consider an appeal from a district court sitting as the fact finder, we do
so through our abuse-of-discretion lense (sic); that is. we examine whether the
trial court (1) rightly perceived the issues as ones of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of that discretion and appropriately applied the legal
principles to the facts found; and (3) reached its decision through an exercise of
reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d
993, 1000 (1991). In conducting our review, we liberally construe the district
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court's findings in favor of the judgment. Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125
Idaho 695, 699, 874 P.2d 506, 510 (1993). We will not disturb a district court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. A court's findings of fact are
not clearly elToneous if they are supported by substantial and competent, though
conflicting, evidence. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources. Inc. v. Travelers Leasing
Corp, 118 Idaho 116, 794 P.2d 1389 (1990); Murgoitio v. Murgoitio, III Idaho
573,576, 726 P.2d 685, 688 (1986); LR.C.P. 52(a).

The basis of the Defendants' appeal is that the District Court did not have sufficient
evidence to find that the long-existing fence in question constituted the boundary line. The
Dakers are essentially seeking to retry the case itself to reach the opposite decision of the District
Court.

The District Court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent

evidence. It is clear from the testimony at trial that all of the witnesses who testified concerning
the boundary line and the fence relied upon the fence as the boundary line.

There was no

evidence whatsoever that any landowner at any time relied upon any survey as the boundary line.
There was no evidence of reliance upon the legal descriptions. The evidence conclusively shows
that the fence in question which stood for over forty years was treated and considered the
boundary line between the two parcels of real property.

There was no conflicting evidence

whatsoever to the Court's findings that the fence was treated by all parties concerned as the
boundary line between the Sims real property and the Daker property. Even without liberally
construing the District Court's findings in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Sims, there was no evidence of
any party or person not treating the fence in question as the boundary line. The survey line was
not known on the ground until Mr. Hollibaugh obtained a survey in 2009.
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The fence in question existed for more than fOliy or fifty years and was well maintained
into 2003 when Alvin Smolinski was still pasturing cattle on the Daker property. Cattle were
pastured on both sides of the fence up to the fence and predecessors in title logged both sides up
to the fence. Mr. and Mrs. Sims rely upon boundary by agreement or boundary by acquiescence
as they did in the District Court. The doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence has
long been established in Idaho's case law.

Evidence of a long-established fence creates two

presumptions:
[W]hen a fence line has been erected, and then coterminous landowners have
treated that fence line as fixing the boundary between their properties "for such a
length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its
location" the law presumes an agreement fixing that fence line as the boundary.
[Omitting citations.]
Second, coupled with the long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary,
"the want of any evidence as to the manner or circumstances of its original
location, the law presumes that it was originally located as a boundary by
agreement because of uncertainty or dispute as to the true line." [Omitting
citation.]
Luce v. Marble. 127 P.3d 167, 142 Idaho 264 (2005).

In Cameron v. Neal. 950 P.2d 1237, 130 Idaho 898 (Idaho 1997), the Court stated:
The doctrine of boundary by agreement has long been established in Idaho's case
law. To have a boundary by agreement, the location of the true boundary
boundary line must be uncertain or disputed and there must be a subsequent
agreement fixing the boundary. Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 41, 794 P.2d
626, 630 (1990). The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the
surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. Id. The existence of such
an agreement between adjoining landowners may appear where their property
rights have been defined by the erection of a fence, followed by treatment of the
fence by the adjoining owners as the boundary. Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho
359,365,262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953). Further, the long existence and recognition
of a fence as a boundary, in the absence of any evidence as to the manner or
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circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that the fence was located
as a boundary by agreement. Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. Wakamatsu. 75
Idaho 232, 241, 270 P.2d 830, 835 (1954). Also, the payment of taxes on the
property by the party asserting ownership of the disputed parcel is not required
when determining a claim based on the doctrine of boundary by agreement.
Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 633 P.2d 592 (1981).
The court stated that the reasonable inference was that "the purpose of the fence was to serve as a
boundary and was a barrier only incidentally, as with most fences." Although the Dakers discuss
payment of taxes and adverse possession, that was not Simses theory of recovery or the District
Curf s basis of judgment.
See also Flying Elk Investment. LLC v. Cornwall. 232 P.3d 330, 149 Idaho 9 (2010),
where the Court recognized the two presumptions and stated:
This Court has repeatedly found a boundary by agreement where a fence is treated
as the property line for a number of years, there is no information about why the
fence was built, and no evidence to disprove that the fence was intended to be a
boundary.
The Dakers contend that the fence cannot be the boundary because it does not run parallel to the
lines identified in the recorded deeds and because the fence does not constitute a straight line. In
Flying Elk a crooked wire fence which divided the parcels ran roughly sixty feet south of
Cornwall's described southern border and intruded into Flying Elk's property and then turned
north and ran haphazardly into Flying Elk's northern boundary.

The fence ran nearly three

hundred feet into Flying Elk's legally described western edge. That left almost nineteen acres of
Flying Elk's deeded legal description on Cornwall's side of the fence. The title to the disputed
19 acres was quieted in Cornwall.
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As the Dakers acknowledge in their Brie±: there is no information as to why the fence in
question was built and there was no evidence whatsoever introduced to disprove that the fence in
question was intended or considered the boundary between the two parties. This Court in Flying
Elk stated that although "the fence encroached on Flying Elk's deeded property. it now marks the
legal boundary between the parties."
In Cecil v. Gagnebin. 202 P.3d 1, 146 Idaho 714 (2009), the Court stated that boundary
by agreement from the location of a fence is "presumed from the long existence of the fence and
the parties' treatment of it as the common boundary. Who built the fence, when it was built, and
why it was built are unknown." The Court found that the fence constituted the boundary in that
case and pointed out that the existence of the fence put the parties on constructive notice of it as
the boundary line. Even though the fence in the instant case became in disrepair well after Mr.
Smolinski ceased using the Daker land around 2004, he had maintained it well for years. Mrs.
Daker acknowledged to Mr. and Mrs. Sims during telephone calls at least four times that the
fences were the boundaries. They were obviously on notice when they purchased.
The Dakers claim that the legal descriptions set forth in the deeds of the parties
apparently require a reversal of the District Court's judgment in the instant case. In District
Court they relied upon the legal descriptions and their survey, but that is not sufficient to reverse
the District Court. In Teton Peaks Investment Co .. LLC v Ohme. 195 P.3d 1207. 146 Idaho 394
(2008), the Court found that evidence that the fence had been erected and treated as the boundary
for over sixty years gave rise to both presumptions set forth in Luce v. lviarble. supra p. 6, and
found that because the parties relying on a survey offer no evidence other than the legal
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descriptions set forth in the deeds, summary judgment was properly awarded in favor of the
parties relying upon the fence.
In Dreher v. Powell. 819 P.2d 569, 120 Idaho 715 (1991), the Court stated that a
boundary by agreement is presumed to arise between neighbors and stated:
[W]here such right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence ... followed
by such adjoining landowners treating [the fence] as fixing the boundary for such
length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its
location. [Citations omitted.]
In the District Court, the Dakers claimed that the fence in question was a "drift" or
"barrier" fence. No evidence was introduced to that effect. Naturally, a boundary fence would
clearly be a barrier to keep cattle in or out. In a case very similar to the instant case, Herrmann v
Woodell, 693 P.2d 1118, 107 Idaho 916 (1985), Herrmanns relied upon a fence which had been

in existence for twenty-five years. The Woodells made no claims to the disputed property until a
survey was completed and then they contended that the fence was constructed by their
predecessors-in-interest as a barrier fence. The Woodells' predecessor in title testified that he
considered the fence to be the boundary line. The Court held that the evidence supported a
finding of acquiescence which established a presumption, unrefuted, that a boundary line
agreement "must have taken place at some point in the past." There is no evidence in the instant
case that the fence was constructed merely as a barrier. In fact, there was no evidence as to the
purpose of the fence and; therefore, because of its long standing and existence, it constituted a
boundary by agreement or acquiescence.
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The Dakers also contend that due to the shape of the parcel in question, the fence cannot
be a boundary line. They cite Luce v. l\1arble, supra. p. 6. In Luce there was no evidence of the
parties on either side of the fences accepting them as the boundary. Furthermore, the .34 acre in
dispute constituted a substantial portion of the 1.34 acres purchased by Marble. The parcel in
dispute was bounded on the north, south and western borders by a fence and surrounded by the
Marble property.

The parcel in question constituted over 25 per cent of the real property

purchased by Marble. The Supreme Court in Marble pointed out that the shape of the parcel in
question was so irregular and encompasses "such a large portion of the Marble property, that an
assumption of acquiescence would be unreasonable."

In the instant case the parcel in dispute

comprised about 3 acres while without it the Dakers had approximately 100 acres. Therefore,
the parcel in dispute in the instant case is less than 2 or 3 per cent of the Daker property.

The

location of the fence in question cannot be considered unreasonable in view of the location
depicted on the enlarged map "Df. Ex. B."
In Wells v. Williamson, 794 P .2d 637, 118 Idaho 48 (1989), affirmed 794 P .2d 626, 118
Idaho 37 (1990), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that it could find nothing in the Court of
Appeals decisions nor the Idaho Supreme Court decisions "which suggest that application of this
doctrine [boundary by agreement] should be arbitrarily limited to the particular size or
configuration of the lot in question."
See also Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, supra p. 7.
In Johnson v. Newport, 960 P.2d 742,131 Idaho 521 (1998), the trial court found that the
reason or circumstance for constructing the old fence of more than sixty years was not
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specifically known and that there was no evidence showing that the old fence was constructed
merely for the convenience of previous landowners or expressly as an agreed boundary. The old
fence followed the course of a creek rather than the line ultimately ascertained by a survey in
1995. The trial court found that there was a boundary by implied agreement that followed the old
fence. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that the shape of the parcel in dispute was
irrelevant.

The Court stated that "the law presumes boundary by agreement from the long

existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary." The facts in Johnson v. Newport were
extremely similar to ours. In affirming the trial court, our Supreme Court stated:
There is also substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court's
findings that (1) the parties and the predecessors each used the land on their
respective sides of the old fence, (2) the parties and the predecessors treated the
old fence as a boundary, and (3) the true boundary was uncertain until the 1995
survey.
The Dakers cite Weitz v. Green. 230 P.3d 743,148 Idaho 851 (Idaho, 2010), to the effect
that a monument such as a fence must be observable sufficient to give notice of the boundary line
agreement for a prospective purchaser. In Weitz v. Green the fence had become dilapidated over
years and as such could not give sufficient notice to a prospective purchaser of the location of the
fence or that the fence constituted a boundary line agreement. In the instant case however, the
fence was well maintained until at least 2004 when Mr. Smolinski sold out and ceased renting the
Daker land for cattle. "Tr. p.28, L. 7 to 14." The fence was obviously in good condition when the
Dakers purchased their land in 1982 and Mrs. Daker acknowledged to Mr. and Mrs. Sims by
telephone that she and her husband bought the entire Daker place by fence line. Mr. Smolinski
first started pasturing cattle on the property in the mid-1970's and maintained the fences until
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2004. Weitz v. Green does not support the Dakers in their appeal. The Dakers were not only on

constructive notice of the fence line, but they knew and acknowledged the fence line as the
boundary.
The Defendants cite D01vney v. Vavold, 166 P.3d 382, 144 Idaho 592 (Idaho, 2007). One
Ron Conner constructed a fence parallel to his property's western boundary, but approximately
six to ten feet on his side of the boundary. There were survey pins that marked the true boundary
line. The fence was inside those survey pins. There are other factors which also distinguished
the Downey case from the instant case. The District Court found that an agreement establishing a
boundary by the fence was not proven.

The Supreme Court held that the District Court's

conclusion was not clearly erroneous. The Court in Downey pointed out that the trial court's
findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. In Lettunich v. Lettunich,
supra p. 5, the Court stated:
Again, our focus in reviewing the district court's order is not on whether we
would have made the same decision, but rather on whether the court's ruling was
based on substantial and competent evidence.
The District Court in this case based its decision upon "substantial and competent evidence."
The Dakers also cited Neider v. Shaw, 65 P.3d 525, 138 Idaho 503 (2003). That case
involved a triangular piece of ground and the party opposing boundary by agreement claimed
that the fence which had been built between 1935 and 1945 was a barrier to prevent cattle from
roaming onto a railroad track. That party produced no evidence to support the theory and the
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment quieting title pursuant to the existing
fence. The facts of the Neider case are somewhat similar to those of the instant case. In Neider
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no one knew who originally built the fence or why. The fence had been in existence for over
fifty years and the parties claiming boundary by agreement considered the fence to be the
western boundary of their property.

V.
CONCLUSION

The District Court's findings of fact and decision can be reversed only if they are found to
be clearly erroneous.
competent evidence.

The District Court's decision is well supported by substantial and
The parties on both sides of the fence in question accepted it as the

boundary line between the two parcels. The fence had been in existence in the mid-1970's and
appeared to be an old fence at that time. It was well maintained by Mr. Alvin Smolinski and in
good condition until 2004. Livestock were run on both sides of the fence and the land on both
sides of the fence was logged as well. There was no evidence of any gate or anybody crossing
the fence for any purpose. The District Court's decision that the fence constituted the boundary
line is well supported by substantial and competent evidence. Except for a survey done in 2009,
there was no evidence to the contrary.
The Dakers even acknowledged and accepted the fences as the boundary lines when they
purchased their land.
conferences.

They said that to Mr. and Mrs. Sims at least four times in telephone

Moreover, when the Dakers sold their land to Mr. and Mrs. Hollibaugh, they

specifically excluded the disputed parcel from the transaction.

It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed.
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DATED this

day

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on the
day of
2012, a full, true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument was served by mail, postage pre-paid, on the following:

Mark S. Snyder
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1346
Lewiston,ID 83501
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